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ABSTRACT
We consider a neoclassical interpretation of Germany and Japan's rapid postwar growth that relies
on a catch-up mechanism through capital accumulation where technology is embodied in new capital
goods. Using a putty-clay model of production and investment, we are able to capture many of the
key empirical properties of Germany and Japan's postwar transitions, including persistently high but
declining rates of labor and total-factor productivity growth, a U-shaped response of the capital-
output ratio, rising rates of investment and employment, and moderate rates of return to capital.
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Per capita GDP increased by over 5 percent per year in Germany in the 1950s and
1960s and over 8 percent per year in Japan; the corresponding ﬁgure for the United
States was 2 percent. What accounts for the remarkable performance of these “eco-
nomic miracles”? A variety of explanations have been put forward, many of which
emphasize the roles played by cultural, institutional, and political factors. Another
strain of the literature, which we pursue in this paper, has emphasized the more
prosaic processes of capital accumulation and technological change as driving forces
for the rapid postwar growth of the German and Japanese economies.1 Outside
of growth-accounting exercises, however, there has been little quantitative research
evaluating this explanation in light of the empirical evidence.
One hypothesis that has been subjected to scrutiny and been founded wanting is
that the postwar growth experiences of Germany and Japan are consistent with the
predictions of a simple optimizing growth model where the initial capital stock is
well below its steady-state level. In his study of Japanese saving behavior, Hayashi
(1989) documents the U-shape of the time series of the wealth-to-income ratio in
postwar Japan and argues that it is inconsistent with the simple capital accumula-
tion hypothesis. Christiano (1989) further argues that one can explain neither the
delayed response of Japanese saving and growth rates nor the long duration of the
catch-up process without substantial modiﬁcations to the baseline growth model.
Finally, King and Rebelo (1993) note that if capital accumulation is an important
contributor to Germany and Japan’s postwar growth, a standard growth model
implies either extremely high real interest rates or extraordinarily high values of
installed capital in the early stages of development; neither prediction appears to
hold true in either country.
The rates of investment, unemployment, and productivity growth in postwar
Germany and Japan also are at odds with the predictions of a standard optimizing
growth model with a low initial capital stock. According to such a model, the
investment share of GDP should initially soar and then decline monotonically as
capital deepening takes place. In Germany and Japan, however, investment rates
started low and then rose. The standard optimizing model also implies that the
eﬀects of low labor productivity and a high return to capital will have oﬀsetting
1See, for example, Maddison (1964), Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1968), Denison and Chung (1976),
and Hulten (1991).
1inﬂuences on employment during the early stage of development, with the result
that employment remains near its steady-state level during the transition. In fact,
the West German unemployment rate exceeded 10 percent in 1950, before gradually
falling to below 2 percent by 1960. The situation was similar in Japan, where a
signiﬁcant degree of underemployment – manifested by relatively high employment
in traditional agricultural and craft sectors – persisted through the 1950s (Denison
and Chung (1976)). Finally, an explanation based solely on an initial shortfall of
capital predicts that labor productivity growth occurs simultaneously with growth
in the capital-labor ratio. This contradicts the empirical ﬁnding that the peak in
labor productivity growth preceded that in capital deepening in both countries.
A second, more promising, hypothesis is that Germany and Japan’s postwar
transitions reﬂected the closing of a gap in technology between these countries and
the United States. Total factor productivity (TFP) in German manufacturing was
about half that in the United States in 1950, and manufacturing TFP in Japan was
only a third the U.S. level in 1955 (van Ark and Pilat (1993)). This gap narrowed
considerably over the next three decades: By 1980, TFP in German manufacturing
had risen to 80 percent of the U.S. level and in Japan it had reached 60 percent
of the U.S. level. Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson (1981) ﬁnd similar results
using TFP measured on the basis of the entire economy. We argue that a signiﬁcant
portion of the initial technology gap resulted from the use of prewar and wartime
industrial machinery and production processes far less eﬃcient than modern tech-
nologies available in the United States. In our view, German and Japanese postwar
investment in capital goods embodying modern production technologies gradually
closed this “machine gap.”2 A natural outcome of this process of capital accumu-
lation with embodied technology is a gradual diﬀusion of productivity gains over
time.
We argue that the observed patterns of investment, employment, and produc-
tivity growth in Germany and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s are consistent with
a growth model based on a putty-clay production technology and capital accumu-
lation with embodied technological change. The process of technological catch-
up was slowed by the putty-clay nature of capital. The relative ﬁxity of existing
2An alternative explanation for this transformation is that an “idea gap” that was not embodied
in the capital stock existed at the end of the war, and that this gap eroded over time. For example,
Parente and Prescott (1994) and Eaton and Kortum (1997) argue that the postwar pattern of
initially high, then falling, TFP growth results from the gradual diﬀusion of technological and
organizational knowledge from the United States to Germany and Japan.
2capital-labor ratios intrinsic to putty-clay capital implies that it is costly to rapidly
increase employment and production. As a result, capital accumulation initially
occurs through a process of “capital widening” that expands employment and pro-
ductive capacity with relatively low rates of investment. During this phase of the
transition, productivity growth is high, owing to the eﬀects of embodied technology,
but the rate of capital accumulation is relatively low, and, as a result, the capital-
output ratio falls. Over time, the economy builds suﬃcient capacity to engage in
standard capital deepening. During this latter phase of the transition, productivity
growth slows while the rate of capital accumulation rises.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a dis-
cussion of the German and Japanese economic performance in the three decades
following the Second World War. Section 3 presents a dynamic general equilibrium
model that incorporates putty-clay capital and embodied technology. In section 4
the transition dynamics of the model are analyzed and compared to the empirical
evidence documented in section 2. Section 5 concludes.
2 Germany and Japan’s Postwar Growth Experiences
Germany and Japan’s postwar growth experiences can be divided into three distinct
periods: an initial phase of immediate postwar reconstruction; an early stage of
technological catch-up marked by rapid increases in productivity and relatively low
rates of capital accumulation; and a later phase of technological catch-up marked
by declining rates of productivity growth and high rates of capital accumulation.
2.1 Stages of Growth
In the immediate postwar period of reconstruction, the economies of Germany and
Japan experienced rapid growth as they recovered from wartime conditions, damage
and destruction to the capital stock and infrastructure, and the inﬂux of millions of
refugees. Although estimates of overall war-related capital destruction are inherently
imprecise and mask the unequal distribution across sectors – for example, German
heavy industry was particularly hard hit and Japan’s shipping ﬂeet was devastated –
a reasonable estimate is that about 20 to 25 percent of Germany’s and Japan’s cap-
ital stocks were destroyed or dismantled (Wolf (1993), Denison and Chung (1976)).
In addition to capital destruction, both Germany and Japan experienced large pop-
ulation inﬂows owing to wartime displacement and postwar repatriation. From 1945
3to 1953, about 10 million people migrated into West Germany; this represented a 25
percent increase in its 1945 population (Wolf (1993)). Some 8 million people repa-
triated to Japan, adding about 10 percent to the population (Denison and Chung
(1976)). Combining the eﬀects of capital destruction and immigration in the im-
mediate postwar period, and taking into account investment during this period, the
capital shortfall in each country was probably on the order of 20 percent as of the
early 1950s.
The period of immediate postwar reconstruction ended around 1950 in West
Germany, and a few years later in Japan.3 Because the immediate postwar phase is
so unusual and owing to the limited quality of available data, we exclude this period
from the analysis in this paper. Instead, we limit ourselves to the two decades
that follow, when both the German and Japanese economies had largely recovered
from the immediate eﬀects of wartime disruption and dislocation, but nonetheless
experienced tremendous growth.
In the early stage of the process of catch-up – occurring primarily in the 1950s –
rates of return on capital were high in Germany and Japan, but business investment
as a share of GDP was depressed. Table 1 shows total real rates of return on equities
and private business ﬁxed investment as a share of GDP for various time periods for
a number of countries. Not surprisingly, in light of the destruction of capital during
the war, the rate of return during the 1950s was especially high in Germany (25
percent) and Japan (28 percent), relative to an (unweighted) average of 15 percent
in the other countries reported in the table. Even with these high rates of return, the
investment shares in Germany and Japan were well below their respective longer-run
averages.
In the later stage of catch-up – occurring during the 1960s and 1970s – rates
of return in Germany and Japan dropped back to levels roughly in line with those
in other countries, and the investment shares in Germany and Japan rose in both
countries. The average rate of return in Germany in the 1960s was in the middle
3In the case of Germany, fundamental economic and monetary reform was instituted in 1948,
and the Federal Republic of Germany was established in 1949. By 1950 industrial production in
Germany had reached its prewar peak and the process of repair and reconstruction of the damaged
capital and infrastructure was mostly complete. This initial phase took somewhat longer in Japan,
but was largely completed around 1953: Economic and monetary reform was initiated in 1949,
and Japan regained its independence in 1952. Japanese industrial production reattained its prewar
peak in 1954. In addition to the sources listed in the ﬁrst footnote of this paper, references on the
immediate postwar periods of Germany and Japan include Wallich (1955), Cohen (1958), Giersch,
Paqu´ e and Schmieding (1993), and Hamada and Kasuya (1993).
4Table 1: Rates of Return and Investment
(average annual rates)
Rate of Return Investment Share
Country 50-59 60-69 70-79 50-59 60-69 70-79
Germany 25 4 -3 14 17 16
Japan 28 9 3 19 26 25
USA 16 6 -1 11 12 12
France 17 1 -1 14 18 16
Italy 20 0 -12 13 12 12
UK 14 7 -1 11 14 15
Canada 13 7 2 17 17 16
Sweden 11 4 -2 15 17 16
Notes: Rate of return is the ex post total return to equities,
taken from Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002). Investment
share denotes the ratio of business ﬁxed investment to GDP,
from OECD (various).
of the range of other countries, while that in Japan was a bit above that of other
countries. The investment share in Japan rose 7 percentage points between the
1950s and 1960s, while that in Germany rose a more modest 3 percentage points.
The investment share was roughly unchanged across the two decades in the other
countries.
In the early stage of catch-up, aggregate TFP growth in Germany and Japan
was very rapid, while capital-output ratios actually fell. Table 1 shows the growth
rates of economy-wide TFP, the capital-labor ratio, and the capital-output ratio
over three periods for Germany, Japan, and four other countries, taken from Wolﬀ
(1996).4 TFP growth during the 1950s averaged nearly 5 percent per year in both
Germany and Japan, well above the rates seen in other European countries or the
United States. In contrast, growth in the capital-labor ratio during the 1950s in
Germany and Japan was on par with that in other countries. The combination of
rapid TFP and a moderate pace of capital accumulation relative to employment
caused the capital-to-output ratio to fall signiﬁcantly in both Germany and Japan.
In France, Holland, and the United States, the capital-to-output ratio declined only
4Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson (1980) follow a somewhat diﬀerent methodology, but
ﬁnd the same basic features of the data as shown in Table 1.
5Table 2: Productivity Growth and Capital Deepening (average growth rates)
TFP K/L K/Y
Country 50-60 60-79 79-89 50-60 60-79 79-89 50-60 60-79 79-89
Germany 4.8 1.9 0.6 4.5 6.7 3.6 -2.1 2.1 1.5
Japan 4.9 2.8 1.2 1.5 10.4 5.0 -4.0 3.4 1.8
USA 1.6 1.1 0.8 2.2 1.9 1.5 -0.3 0.0 0.2
France 2.9 2.2 1.0 3.8 6.2 4.2 -0.7 1.5 1.6
Holland 2.6 2.6 0.6 3.6 4.9 2.9 -0.5 0.3 1.2
UK 0.5 1.2 0.5 4.4 5.3 3.3 2.1 2.0 1.5
Notes: K/L denotes the capital-labor ratio; K/Y denotes the capital-output ratio.
Statistics refer to the entire economy. Source: Wolﬀ (1996)
modestly over the 1950s, and in the UK it actually rose.
In the later stage of catch-up, the earlier patterns of TFP growth and capital
accumulation are reversed. TFP growth slowed by 3 percentage points in Germany
and by 2 percentage points in Japan during this stage, while in other countries it
changed little on average. The capital-labor ratio rose sharply in Germany and
Japan during this stage.
Our theory emphasizes the role of capital accumulation in response to capital
destruction and delayed adoption of new technologies. Arguably, the economic expe-
rience of other European countries such as France, Italy and Holland reﬂects some
of the same economic forces during this time period, although to a lesser degree
than Germany and Japan. Indeed the data suggest qualitatively similar though
more muted patterns of growth and capital accumulation for these countries. Both
France and Italy experienced high rates of return on capital combined with relatively
modest rates of investment during the early phase of transition. For these countries,
the rates of return on capital decline rapidly while the investment shares stay rela-
tively constant over time. France also shows a strikingly similar albeit more muted
pattern of growth in total factor productivity and the capital-labor ratio compared
to Germany and Japan. As in Germany and Japan, TFP growth in France is ini-
tially high but declines over time while the growth rate in the capital-labor ratio is
low and rising between the 50-60 and 60-79.
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Figures 1 and 2 provide additional graphical evidence for two distinct phases of
catch-up for Germany and Japan.5 For each country, the upper panel shows the
levels of the capital-output ratio (K/Y), TFP, and output per hour (Y/L) in the
manufacturing sector. These series are normalized to 100 in 1980. The lower panel of
each ﬁgure shows the smoothed growth rates for the capital-labor ratio (K/L), TFP,
and output per hour in the manufacturing sector. To reduce the higher frequency
ﬂuctuations in the growth rate series, we ﬁt a spline approximation to the level data
and compute growth rates from these spline approximations.
5We thank Bart van Ark and Dirk Pilat, who kindly provided us with their data for these two
ﬁgures.
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In the early phase of catch-up, German manufacturing experienced high rates
of labor and total factor productivity growth, but the capital-output ratio declined
reﬂecting the relatively subdued pace of capital accumulation. This early period
lasted for about the decade of the 1950s, over which time the capital-output ratio
fell by nearly 30 percent from its 1950 level. Consistent with the economywide data
documented in Table 1, productivity growth peaked well in advance of the peak
in the rate of growth in the capital-labor ratio. During the later stage, beginning
in about 1960, productivity growth in German manufacturing slowed, while the
capital-output ratio increased as the pace of capital deepening accelerated.
8The patterns of productivity and capital deepening in Japanese manufacturing
are similar to that in Germany. As shown in Figure 2, the decline in the capital-
output ratio is much more pronounced in Japan and the initial rise in productivity
growth rates occurs later than in Germany. Again, the rate of productivity growth
peaks well in advance of the peak rate of increase in the capital-labor ratio.
2.2 Sources of Growth
A key factor contributing to the low level of productivity in the early postwar period
is that Germany and Japan had fallen further behind the technological frontier
represented by the United States during the war years.6 The technological isolation
experienced by Germany and Japan during both the prewar military build-up and
the war itself contributed to the slow diﬀusion of new technologies. Ohkawa and
Rosovsky (1968, p.42) summarize the situation in Japan as follows:
The war and its aftermath produced a long interruption of normal Japanese
private sector investment, and hence an especially large gap or pool of
untapped modern technology. This was further enlarged by the acceler-
ation of productivity growth in industrialized countries generally.
Another factor contributing to Germany and Japan’s growth opportunities at the
end of the war was the lack of widespread application of mass-production techniques
in both countries during the prewar period. Relatedly, the absence of industries pro-
ducing modern consumer durables on a wide scale aﬀorded additional opportunities
for rapid growth in the postwar period. Finally, sectoral transformations yielded
productivity gains as both economies shifted away from military-related activities
and the agricultural and craft sectors toward private industrial production.7
For each of these contributing factors, the adoption of new techniques and the
development of new industries required substantial amounts of new investment in
6German labor productivity fell from 46 percent of the U.S. level in 1938 to only 30 percent in
1950, a 35 percent drop in the level of relative productivity. The percent decline in Japan’s relative
productivity was of the same magnitude. Germany and Japan did not regain their prewar positions
relative to the United States again until around 1960 (Maddison (1991)).
7Interestingly, increases in human capital do not appear to have contributed much to Ger-
many and Japan’s postwar productivity catch-up relative to the United States (see Denison (1967),
Denison and Chung (1976), and Maddison (1995)). Nevertheless, the existence of a well-educated
workforce and sizable pools of scientists and engineers in both Germany and Japan was key to those
countries’ ability to adopt and adapt new production methods and technologies. More generally,
following the immediate postwar reconstruction phase, both countries beneﬁtted from legal and
institutional structures and monetary regimes that constituted a “social capability” for growth, in
the terms of Abramovitz (1995).
9plant and equipment. Because they share the characteristic that the productivity
improvement is embodied in investment, we lump these diﬀerent factors together
under the general rubric of “embodied technological change.”
3 The Model
Previous research on the postwar catch-up of Germany and Japan has focussed
on production technologies that feature a high degree of substitutability between
capital and labor. Putty-clay capital provides an alternative view, in which capital-
labor ratios on existing machines are rigid.8 As a consequence, in the early stage of
catch-up, investment is directed at adding new machines with relatively low capital
intensity. As emphasized by Maddison (1964), such “capital widening” expands
the employment and output capacity of industry, but dampens the growth rate of
capital relative to labor. Over time, the catch-up process switches from one of
capital widening to one of capital-deepening, that is, raising the quantity of capital
per worker. During this latter stage, capital serves as a substitute for labor in
production, and the capital-labor ratio increases rapidly.
We evaluate Germany and Japan’s transition dynamics in an optimizing gen-
eral equilibrium model based on putty-clay technology developed in Gilchrist and
Williams (2000). This framework naturally admits a distinction between capital
widening and capital deepening – that is, between investment on the extensive and
intensive margins – that is entirely absent from the standard putty-putty model. In
the putty-clay model, capital goods embody the level of technology and the choice
of capital intensity made at the time of their creation. Ex ante, the choice of capital
intensity – the amount of capital to be used in conjunction with one unit of labor –
is based on a standard Cobb-Douglas production function. Ex post, the production
function is of the Leontief form with a zero-one utilization decision. Over time, as
the leading-edge technology improves, older, less eﬃcient vintages of capital become
too costly to operate and are scrapped.
8The putty-clay model was originally introduced by Johansen (1959). For further references to
the putty-clay literature and a more detailed description of the model described below, see Gilchrist
and Williams (2000).
103.1 The Production Technology
Each period a set of new investment “projects” becomes available. Constant returns
to scale implies an indeterminacy of scale at the level of projects, so without loss
of generality, we normalize all projects to employ one unit of labor at full capacity.
We refer to these projects as “machines.” The productive eﬃciency of a machine
initiated at time t is aﬀected by four terms: the economywide level of disembodied
technology At, the economywide level of vintage technology, µt, an idiosyncratic
shock to productivity, ¹t, and the amount of capital invested per machine, kt. We
assume that capital goods require one period for initial installation and fail at the
exogenous rate ±.
The economywide levels of disembodied and vintage (embodied) technologies
follow stochastic processes described in the next section. We assume that the trend
level of embodied technology increases over time with gross growth rate (1+ g)1¡®,
while disembodied technology has no trending component.9 The idiosyncratic shock





where the mean correction term ¡1
2¾2 implies E(¹t) = 1. The realized level of
combined vintage and idiosyncratic eﬃciency ¹tµt is assumed to be permanent and
thus embodied in the machine.
Final-goods output produced at time t by a machine built in period t ¡ j with
embodied technology ¹t¡jµt¡j and capital kt¡j is given by
Yt(¹t¡jµt¡jk®
t¡j) = At 1fLt(¹t¡jµt¡jk®
t¡j) = 1g ¹t¡jµt¡jk®
t¡j; (1)
where Lt(¹t¡jµt¡jk®
t¡j) is labor employed at the machine and the zero-one indicator
function 1fLt(¹t¡jµt¡jk®
t¡j) = 1g reﬂects the Leontief nature of machine production
with unit labor capacity. Let
Xt ´ ¹tµtk®
t (2)
denote the eﬃciency level of a particular machine, and let ¯ Xt = µtk®
t denote the
mean eﬃciency of such machines. To characterize the production possibilities of
this economy, we note that, once produced, machines are distinguished only by
their eﬃciency level X. Let Ht(X) denote the quantity of machines of eﬃciency
9This distinction between the underlying sources of trend productivity growth is of no conse-
quence for the analysis in this paper.





1fLt(X) = 1gXHt(X)dX (3)





The quantity of machines with eﬃciency X available for production at time
t + 1 equals the quantity of machines that survive from period t plus the quantity
of new machines with eﬃciency X that are put into place at time t. The log-
normal distribution for ¹t implies that Xt is also log-normally distributed with
E(logXtj ¯ Xt) = log ¯ Xt ¡ 1
2¾2. Hence, the quantity of machines of a given eﬃciency
X evolves according to
Ht+1(X) = (1 ¡ ±)Ht(X) + (¾X)¡1Á(
1
¾




where Á() is the standard normal probability distribution function and Qt is the
aggregate quantity of new machines that are put in place at time t. The term
(¾X)¡1Á( 1
¾(logX¡log ¯ Xt+ 1
2¾2)) thus is the density of new machines with eﬃciency
level X.
In the absence of government spending or other uses of output, aggregate con-
sumption, Ct, satisﬁes
Ct = Yt ¡ ktQt; (6)
where ktQt equals aggregate investment expenditures.10












where 0 < ¯ < 1;° > 0, and ³ > 0. The labor endowment, Nt, is assumed to grow at
a constant rate n, Nt = N0(1+n)t. The social planner chooses contingency plans for
factor utilization, fLt(X);8X > 0g, and investment decisions, fkt;Qtg, to maximize
welfare subject to the labor endowment and equations 2 – 6. The information set at
10We abstract from international trade. In principle, the process of catch-up can be accelerated
by borrowing from abroad. For Germany and Japan, the trade balance tended to be roughly in
balance on average over the 1950s and 1960s, suggesting that the closed-economy assumption is not
a bad approximation for the purposes of this paper.
12time t includes the current and past levels of economywide disembodied technology,
At; and embodied technology, µt. However, the idiosyncratic shock to individual
machines ¹t is revealed only after period t allocations are made.
3.2 The Utilization and Investment Decisions
Each period the social planner chooses which machines to utilize and which machines
to leave idle. Given the Leontief structure of production and the assumption of no
machine startup or shutdown costs, this decision problem is static in nature and is
equivalent to the choice of a cutoﬀ value, Wt, whereby machines with productivity












measure the productivity diﬀerence between the eﬃciency of the marginal machine
in use at time t and the mean eﬃciency of a vintage s machine.
Capacity utilization of the set of vintage s machines at time t – the ratio of
actual output produced by all vintage s machines to the amount of output that
would be produced if all such machines were operated at full capacity – is given by
(1 ¡ Φ(zs
t ¡ ¾)), where Φ(¢) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution
function. Equation 3 then implies that aggregate output may be expressed as a
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where 1 ¡ Φ(zs
t) = Pr(AtXs > WtjAt;Wt) is the share of vintage s machines in use
at time t.
The social planner’s problem may now be restated in terms of the choices of
the cutoﬀ, Wt; the capital intensity for new machines, kt, and the number of new
machines, Qt, produced at time t. Formally, the social planner chooses contingency
13plans for the sequence fWt+s;kt+s;Qt+sg1
s=0 to maximize equation 7 given the stock
of existing machines and the labor endowment, and subject to equations 2, 5, 6, 8,
9, and 10.
Let Uc;t+s denote the marginal utility of consumption and UL;t denote the
marginal utility associated with an incremental increase in work (decrease in leisure).
The optimal cutoﬀ Wt satisﬁes
Uc;tWt + UL;t = 0: (11)














The ﬁnal term in the right-hand side of this expression equals the marginal gain
to production associated with an incremental increase in kt, taking into account
expected future rates of capital utilization implied by equation 11.11 Similarly, the












The left-hand side of this expression equals the forgone utility associated with pro-
ducing a new machine with capital intensity kt. The right-hand side of this ex-
pression equals the incremental gain in the present discounted value of the future
utility associated with the additional output from such a machine less the disutility
of labor associated with operating such a machine.
We calibrate the model using standard parameter values from the literature (e.g.,
Kydland and Prescott (1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)). Each period
in the model corresponds to one year. The calibrated parameters are ¯ = 0:97; ° =
2; ³ = 3; g = 0:024; n = 0:01; ± = 0:1; ® = 0:36. Trend growth in labor is chosen
to match the German and Japanese postwar data; trend productivity growth is set
equal to its average rate in the United States over 1950–80. The results reported in
11An increase in k has a direct eﬀect on output through its eﬀect on ¯ Xs. It also potentially has
an indirect eﬀect through utilization rates – a higher k implies increased utilization. The marginal











and hence the indirect eﬀect vanishes at the optimum.
14this paper are not sensitive to reasonable variations in these parameters. Following
Gilchrist and Williams (2000), we set ¾ = 0:15 in the putty-clay model.
4 Model Experiments
In this section, we examine the transition dynamics of the putty-clay model in
response to destruction of the capital stock and to the availability of new, more
productive technologies. We start by considering the eﬀects of capital destruction.
This experiment highlights the importance of putty-clay capital in explaining key
aspects of labor and capital transition dynamics. In the next two experiments, we
consider increases in disembodied and embodied technology. Finally, the fourth ex-
periment combines both capital destruction and increases in embodied technology in
an empirically plausible manner, and evaluates the model’s ability to match features
of Germany and Japan’s postwar experiences along a number of dimensions.
4.1 Capital Destruction
We begin our model experiments by considering the eﬀects of destroying 20 percent
of the capital stock.12 The magnitude of the simulated shock is roughly consistent
with estimates of the eﬀects of war-related destruction and population inﬂows, as
discussed in section 2. The results from this experiment are shown in Figure 3,
which plots the dynamic responses of the percent deviations of labor, output, and
the capital-output ratio from their respective steady-state values. The upper panel
shows the response for the putty-clay model, while the lower panel shows the re-
sponse for the Solow putty-putty model, which allows ex post capital-labor substi-
tutibility but is otherwise identical to the putty-clay model described above.13
In the putty-clay model, capital destruction has an immediate large negative
eﬀect on employment and output, owing to the short-run complementarity between
capital and labor implied by the Leontief nature of production. Employment initially
falls by 15 percent and output falls by 17 percent. Along the transition path, output,
capital, and employment all rise monotonically. The capital-output ratio exhibits a
U-shaped response: After a small initial drop, the capital-output ratio declines for
several years before gradually returning to its steady-state value.
12We simulate the model using an extended path algorithm based on Fair and Taylor (1983). For
the simulations, we truncate the maximum lifespan of machines at 45 years.
13Gilchrist and Williams (2000), section 2.e, provide a full speciﬁcation of the Solow putty-putty
model.
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Percent Deviation from Steady State
In the Solow putty-putty model, employment actually rises in response to the
destruction in capital. As a result, the initial drop in output is 7 percent – less than
half as large as in the putty-clay model. This decline in output roughly equals the
product of the capital share times the amount of capital destroyed. The modest
rise in employment occurs because the high rate of return on savings oﬀsets the low
marginal product of labor. Along the transition path, employment gradually falls
while output and the capital stock rise. After a sharp initial drop of 14 percent, the
capital-output ratio rises monotonically back to its steady-state value.
The two models imply very diﬀerent transition dynamics for employment and the
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capital-output ratio, with the predictions of the putty-clay model more consistent
with the data along these dimensions. Figure 4 decomposes the response of aggregate
investment in the putty-clay model into capital per machine and the quantity of
new machines. Investment along the extensive margin (machine quantity) increases
sharply, reﬂecting the process of capital widening. Given this rapid pace of machine
creation, if the capital-labor ratio of new machines were to remain constant, the
implied rate of investment would be very high. Such high rates of investment would
entail either a sharp rise in the marginal cost of production or a large reduction
in consumption. By reducing capital per machine, productive capacity is quickly
restored while investment rates are kept low, as seen in the ﬁgure. With additions to
capacity, investment along the intensive margin increases and capital per machine
gradually returns to its steady-state level. This initial phase of capital widening
followed by one of capital deepening underlies the U-shaped response of the capital-
output ratio in the putty-clay model.
4.2 An Increase in Disembodied Technology
Although capital destruction alone can explain some of the features in the German
and Japanese data, it cannot account for the magnitude of the decline in the capital-
output ratio or the patterns in productivity growth experienced by Germany and
Japan during the postwar period. To explain these phenomena, we now consider
transition dynamics in response to permanent increases in technology. We begin by






















considering the eﬀect of an increase in disembodied technology for the putty-clay
model.14
Figure 5 shows the transition dynamics following an immediate permanent rise in
the level of disembodied technology. The upper panel of the ﬁgure reports the levels
of the capital-output ratio, TFP, and labor productivity; the lower panel shows the
growth rates of the capital-labor ratio, TFP, and labor productivity. These variables
correspond to the data plotted in Figures 1 and 2. In the exercises reported in the
14Because production possibilities are immediately expanded in response to disembodied tech-
nological change, the relative ﬁxity of factor proportions has little eﬀect on transition dynamics in
this experiment, and we obtain very similar results with the Solow putty-putty model.
18remainder of the paper, the magnitude of the productivity shock is calibrated to
roughly match the degree of catch-up in economywide TFP for Germany relative to
the United States achieved by 1980.
The transition dynamics implied by a one-time increase in disembodied techno-
logical change are clearly at odds with the data for Germany and Japan. This shock
generates a monotonically increasing capital-output ratio and virtually no growth
in total-factor productivity following the initial increase.15 In addition, the growth
rate in the capital-labor ratio declines monotonically over time, in contrast to the
hump-shaped pattern observed in the data.
4.3 An Increase in Embodied Technology
The transition dynamics implied by an immediate increase in embodied technology
provide a much better ﬁt to the historical data than do those implied by an immedi-
ate increase in disembodied technology. Figure 6 reports the eﬀects of an immediate
permanent rise in µt – the mean level of technology determining the productivity of
new machines – in the putty-clay model.16
The productivity gains associated with an increase in embodied technology occur
only as the leading-edge technology is incorporated in the existing capital stock. As
in the case of capital destruction, investment is limited by rapidly rising marginal
costs of production in the short run. As a result, the initial expansion of output,
hours, and investment is muted. This gradual adoption of new technology through
investment explains the high but declining growth rates of total-factor and labor
productivity.17
An increase in embodied technology also provides a natural explanation for the
15We compute TFP as a Solow residual from the Cobb-Douglas production function where the
“capital stock” is calculated according to the standard perpetual inventory method. Because the
putty-clay model deviates from both of these assumptions, this measure of TFP diﬀers from the
true level of disembodied technology. The relatively small variation in measured TFP growth shown
in the ﬁgure is a result of this mismeasurement.
16Qualitatively, the results from this experiment are similar to those in a putty-putty model.
Quantitatively, the putty-putty model implies a stronger comovement between productivity and
capital deepening that is less compatible with the empirical evidence.
17If the capital stock were measured in eﬃciency units, all the productivity gains resulting from
an increase in embodied technology would be ascribed to capital accumulation rather than TFP.
Throughout this paper, we assume that changes in embodied technology are not reﬂected in the
data for investment and capital stocks. We believe this approach is appropriate for comparisons of
simulated to actual data. Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) argue that the U.S. data in
the postwar period incorporate only a fraction of the improvements in embodied technology. The
national accounts of Germany and Japan are computed in a similar fashion.

























U-shaped response of the capital-output ratio. Because there is no direct eﬀect
of the increase in technology on measured productivity, neither output nor capital
shows much response in the initial period. The initial phase of the expansion is then
characterized by a period of capital widening as productive capacity is increased at
low cost. This period of declining capital-output ratios lasts for several years, after
which the economy begins the process of capital deepening. During this latter phase,
the capital-output ratio rises monotonically as the economy converges to the new
steady state.
The process of capital widening followed by capital deepening also explains the
20hump-shaped response of the growth rate in the capital-labor ratio observed in the
data. With the rapid expansion in machine quantity, labor is growing nearly as
rapidly as capital. As productive capacity is established, the growth rate of the
capital-labor ratio increases. This growth rate peaks a few years after the start of
the transition. During the capital-deepening phase, the growth rate of the capital-
labor ratio remains above its steady-state rate but declines monotonically over time.
4.4 A Rapid Phase-In of Embodied Technology
The preceding simulations suggest that both capital destruction and embodied tech-
nological change are key elements in explaining the transition dynamics of post-war
Germany and Japan. In this section we consider the combined implications of capi-
tal destruction and technological change. In the previous experiment, the access to
new technology was assumed to be immediate, with only the forces of capital accu-
mulation slowing it down. Such an assumption is most likely too stark a description
of how rapidly new technologies can be adopted however. Arguably, it takes some
time for producers to identify and purchase new capital goods and put into place
production processes that are most appropriate for their industry. Accordingly, we
also make allowance for some delay in Germany and Japan’s obtaining complete
access to the leading-edge technology associated with new capital goods. We still
abstract from other features of the economy, habit formation or subsistence levels of
consumption and investment adjustment costs, which may further slow investment
and the transition to the new steady state.18 Such delay mechanisms would have
similar implications for model dynamics as our assumption of a rapid phase-in of
the new technology.
We model the rapid phase-in of technology as a series of anticipated increases in
µt, where the ultimate increase in the level of embodied technology is the same as
in the preceding experiment. Our goal in this exercise is to emphasize the process
of capital accumulation rather than diﬀusion as the primary driving force behind
the catch-up process. Accordingly, we assume that the technology diﬀuses quickly.
Speciﬁcally, the increase in the level of embodied technology is assumed to be (1 ¡
18See for example, Alvarez (2004), who considers the role of habit formation in slowing invest-
ment following a capital-destruction shock. Similarly, preferences may include a subsistence level
of consumption which, particularly in the case of Japan, would imply more gradual capital accu-
mulation early in the transition (Christiano 1989). Moreover, capital market imperfections and
adjustment costs may have reduced investment growth relative to the optimal amount described in
the simulations.
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0:75t) in period t, which implies that 25 percent of the ultimate rise in µ occurs
within one year, and 75 percent within ﬁve years. We further assume that the
economy starts with a capital stock that is 20 percent below its steady-state level.
The transition dynamics for the combined simulation are plotted in Figure 7.
The rapid phase-in of embodied technology provides an incentive to delay in-
vestment in the ﬁrst few years of the transition process in order to take advantage
of additional improvements in technology yet to come. In addition to delaying the
investment process, the rapid phase-in implies that productivity growth rates are
initially low and rising, peaking several years out. This pattern reﬂects both the
22direct eﬀect of the path of technology and the indirect eﬀect of delayed capital
expenditures relative to the case of an immediate increase in technology.
The U-shaped response of the capital-output ratio in the model is now more
pronounced and provides a close match to those observed in the data. In terms of
growth rates, we again observe a hump-shaped response of the capital-labor growth
rate. Initially, labor is growing even more rapidly than capital. The peak response
of the capital-labor growth rate occurs a few years after the peak response in pro-
ductivity, a ﬁnding that again is in broad agreement with the data.
4.5 Rates of Return, Investment, and Employment
The rapid phase-in of embodied technology combined with capital destruction cap-
tures the major features of capital and productivity dynamics during Germany and
Japan’s postwar transition. We now focus on the dynamic responses of the rate
of return to capital, investment, and employment. Overall, the model succeeds at
resolving the puzzling issue as to why employment, investment, and rates of return
were relatively low in the early stages of transition, despite the tremendous growth
opportunities that these countries faced at the time.
With the rapid phase-in of embodied technology, real rates of return are plausible
and not inconsistent with the relatively high realized rates of return on equity in
Germany and Japan during the post-war period. Table 3 compares the model’s
implications for the real return to capital to the actual data. We consider the
eﬀects of the combined experiment of capital destruction and embodied technological
change, with and without a rapid phase-in of technology. Without a phase-in of
embodied technology, the rate of return averages 36 percent over the ﬁrst ﬁve years,
somewhat above the recorded levels. This initial spike in rates of return reﬂects
the large investment opportunities available at the start of the transition. Although
substantially lower than the 500 percent rate of return obtained by King and Rebelo
(1993) in their study of transition dynamics applied to Germany and Japan, such
returns are somewhat high relative to actual returns during this period. With a
phase-in of the shock, the simulated rate of return averages 12 percent over the ﬁrst
half of the 1950s, and then rises to 22 percent during the second half of the decade.
The rate of return to capital then gradually converges to its long-run value of about
8 percent.
The combination of capital destruction and an increase in embodied technology
23Table 3: Rates of Return and Investment Share
(average annual rates)
Rate of Return Investment Share
50-54 55-59 60-69 50-54 55-59 60-69
Simulated data
Immediate 36 17 11 4 2 1
Phased-in 12 22 14 -2 2 1
Actual data
Germany 23 27 4 -3 -0 1
Japan 28 28 9 -7 -5 1
Notes: Investment share reported as diﬀerence from 1980 value.
For sources, see Table 1.
causes the investment share initially to drop, but then rise steadily over most of the
1950s. Loss of capacity combined with some delayed access to frontier technologies
dampens investment for several years. The simulated and actual investment shares,
reported as diﬀerences from their respective 1980 levels, are shown in Table 3. With
an immediate increase in the level of embodied technology, the investment share
initially rises four percentage points above its 1980 level and remains elevated at
that level for several years. In contrast, with the phased-in shock, the simulated
investment share in 1950 is about 6 percentage points below its 1980 level. By
comparison, Germany’s 1950 investment share was about 3-1/2 percentage points
below its 1980 level and Japan’s 1953 investment share (the ﬁrst year for which
we have data) was about 8 percentage points below its 1980 level. The model
predicts a relatively rapid return of the investment share to its steady-state level
by 1953, followed by modestly high rates of investment. A similar pattern is seen
in the German data, where the investment share reached its 1980 level by 1955
and surpassed it slightly for a number of years thereafter. The investment share in
Japan, however, continued to increased markedly in the 1960s.
Finally, the model predicts a sharp rise in employment during the 1950s. Fig-
ure 8 plots detrended employment for Germany and Japan, along with employment
implied by the model simulation.19 The employment patterns for Germany and
19To detrend employment, we ﬁrst estimate a log-linear trend over the period 1965-1990. We
then extrapolate this trend backwards and subtract it from the full sample of data, starting in 1950.
This procedure allows us to capture labor movements associated with transition dynamics rather
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Japan are remarkably similar – employment starts 20 percent below trend and rises
monotonically throughout the 1950s, with Germany reaching its trend level some-
what more rapidly than Japan. In the model simulation, employment begins 16
percent below trend and rises monotonically over most of the decade. Although the
model’s employment dynamics are more rapid than those apparent in the data, the
model succeeds in matching the magnitude of the employment response, which is
governed by the putty-clay features of the model.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a neoclassical interpretation of the postwar growth expe-
riences of Germany and Japan. Unlike research that has focussed exclusively on the
role of capital accumulation in a standard growth model, we emphasize the impor-
tance of the gap in the level of technology embodied in capital goods and its eﬀect
on capital accumulation and productivity growth. In the postwar period, Germany
and Japan regained access to advanced technologies embodied in capital goods avail-
able from the United States and elsewhere. According to this view, Germany and
Japan’s “economic miracles” reﬂected a closing of the gap in “machines.” This pro-
cess was slowed by the putty-clay nature of capital, which necessitated an early stage
of capital widening to expand productive capacity before capital deepening could
than more general demographic forces and trends in participation rates that are relevant in the full
sample period.
25fully take place. In the putty-clay model, an empirically plausible combination of
capital destruction and increases in embodied technology can explain the patterns
of productivity, capital accumulation, employment, and rates of return to capital
during Germany and Japan’s postwar transition.
Germany and Japan’s postwar growth experiences provide prime examples of
economic transitions determined by embodied technology and putty-clay capital.
The postwar patterns of productivity and capital accumulation in Italy, and to a
lesser extent, France, share similar qualities with those of Germany and Japan,
although the scale of the transition is smaller. These factors are also likely to have
been key inﬂuences on transitions in post-communist and other newly industrializing
countries. Finally, embodied technological change is an important source of growth
in the United States and a key ingredient in the U.S. productivity acceleration in
the late 1990s.20 This paper contributes to our understanding of the medium-run
dynamics that we should expect from such growth opportunities.
20See, for example, Greenwood et al. (1997), Oliner and Sichel (2000), and Greenwood and
Jovanovic (2001)).
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